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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION: TRANSFER OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY WITH MILITARY APPLICATIONS

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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AUSTRALIA

[Original: English]

[11 August 1992]

1. The Government of Australia has always maintained a principled approach to defence and related exports and strict controls apply. This is also true in relation to the export of high technology with military applications.

2. In recent times various efforts have been made to halt the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. However, the spread of weapons technology facilitating the production of such weapon systems could undermine these efforts and thus attempts must be made to introduce controls. Given the dual-use nature of some military technology introducing controls may prove to be a difficult task, although this should not stop countries from taking the necessary preventive measures.

3. As was agreed at the United Nations Disarmament Commission earlier this year, there is a need for the establishment of norms and guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications to ensure international peace and security. Simultaneously, this process must not deny access to high technology products, services and knowledge for peaceful purposes. The Government of Australia believes that its regulations meet these criteria.

4. Australia participates in various groups and is party to agreements that aim to control the spread of technology likely to be used for military purposes, including: the Australia Group; the Nuclear Suppliers Group; the Zangger Committee; the Missile Technology Control Regime; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Government of Australia supports efforts to expand the membership and strengthen adherence to the guidelines as set forth by these groups.

5. The "Australian Controls on the Export of Defence and Related Goods, Guidelines for Exporters" (March 1992) provide for the regulation of high technology with military applications, refer in particular to the definition of goods under categories part 1A, 1B, and 2. The "Australian Controls on the Export of Technology with Civil and Military Applications, a Guide for Exporters and Importers" (October 1991) provides all relevant details of Australian controls on dual-use technology.

6. Under Australian controls, dual-use technology is defined as technology, goods and services that, although developed for commercial purposes, can be used either as military components or for the development or production of military systems. In 1989 Australian Regulation 13E was amended to control the export of dual-use technology to all destinations.

7. Australia's dual-use technology controls distinguish four generic groups of goods:

(a) The Industrial List.

(b) The Missile List, comprising items whose transfer the Missile Technology Control Regime aims to limit since they could be used for nuclear weapons delivery systems. After joining the Regime in 1990, exports of Australian missile-related goods and technology have been prohibited to those end-users having missile programmes or aspirations contrary to agreed non-proliferation guidelines.

(c) The Nuclear List.

(d) The Chemical List, comprising industrial goods and technology that have applications in the development, production and testing of chemical warfare agents.

8. Comprehensive details regarding dual-use technology export control procedures are contained in annex A of appendix B (available in the Secretariat for reference).

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

[Original: Russian]

[24 August 1992]

1. The task of ensuring the advancement and irreversibility of the process of achieving radical reductions in armaments is certainly of cardinal importance, as are the closely related tasks of strengthening the rules concerning non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strengthening strategic stability in these times of transition from confrontation between East and West to cooperation and partnership. These positive processes must also be fostered as fully as possible by appropriate use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress, for the development of scientific and technological potential is today a most important element in a country's national security.

2. In themselves, science and technology are neutral: developments in these fields can have both positive and negative effects on international security. In the new conditions of a mutually dependent world they must become a powerful factor in strengthening security and trust and increasing openness and transparency, and they must facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures, for example by ensuring that such measures can be verified and by generally promoting the improvement of people's lives on earth.

3. Russia is in favour of a broad and mutually advantageous exchange of the achievements of human genius in science and technology and of access to the achievements of progressive scientific thinking in the whole world community.

4. We are convinced that today, when a new world order is being consolidated on this planet, the ideological confrontation and conflict between East and West, North and South must be replaced by a single information and science and technology space, the benefits of which would be used by all States of the world on a non-discriminatory basis. Here the technically more advanced countries could render the necessary assistance to the States just setting out on the path of intensive development of science and technology - both on commercial terms and free of charge - under the auspices of the world community or on a bilateral basis.

5. In scientific and technological exchanges special attention must of course be given to preventing as effectively as possible the dissemination of technology and knowledge which could be used to violate the non-proliferation rules and circumvent the restrictions on the export of dual-use items. However, States do of course have a right to cooperation in the development and exchange of technologies for peaceful uses.

6. The task of preventing the use of new technologies for the upgrading of weaponry remains an important and immediate one. Russia intends actively to endeavour to ensure that the efforts of the countries Members of the United Nations are directed towards the prevention of a qualitative arms race and promote broader access by all States to the achievements of scientific and technological progress for peaceful purposes.

7. It is essential to ensure the absolute prevention of the creation of new types and systems of weapons, especially weapons with great strike power, and to shut off new avenues of the arms race.

8. Given the radical reduction in the arsenals of strategic offensive weapons of the biggest nuclear Powers, what is now most needed is to restrain to the maximum possible degree the creation of new generations of strategic offensive and defensive weapons and to prevent an arms race in outer space, with a ban on all forms and types of anti-satellite weapons. It is necessary to prevent the use for weapons purposes of laser, kinetic and electromagnetic devices.

9. Support is still being given as well to the idea of placing a ban on the creation of non-nuclear armaments based on new physical principles whose strike capacities approach those of nuclear or other means of mass destruction.

10. There must be a general prohibition on any further use of scientific and technological achievements for the development and manufacture of new generations and types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as types and systems of conventional weapons.

11. We welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 45/60 entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security", in which the Secretary-General is requested to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session a framework for technology assessment guided, inter alia, by the criteria suggested in his report on the subject.

12. The conclusions and recommendations contained in the United Nations study on the question of charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours indicate that ecological problems and environmental protection might become an extremely promising area for use of the product of such conversion.

13. Science and technology must play their part in the successful solution of the problem of the destruction or decommissioning of surplus armaments and military technologies, in the utilization of this military matériel for civilian purposes, in the elimination or reorientation of certain military branches of industry and in conversion. The leaders of Russia attach special importance to the problem of the safe use of the nuclear material released as a result of disarmament and are ready to engage in broadly based international cooperation in this field.

14. In step with the progress in the solution of practical disarmament problems, the questions of verification and control of the agreements concluded in this sphere are growing many times more complicated. The leading role of scientific and technological means of monitoring the observance of disarmament agreements is beyond dispute. Why not organize under the auspices of the United Nations a high-level international seminar on contemporary technological means of monitoring and their possible application in disarmament agreements? The results of such a seminar would be of practical interest to the many countries in the world which are cutting back their military potential.

15. The development of international links and the removal of artificial Berlin walls between countries and peoples are also producing an actual expansion of flows of scientific and technological information and technology and exchanges of scientific developments across State frontiers. One item now on the agenda is the development of universally acceptable international norms or guidelines to regulate the transfer of high technology with military applications.

16. It is important to continue the policy of building mutual understanding between the suppliers and recipients of modern technology and to seek to make universal the systems of export controls on the supply of dual-use material, equipment and technology which could potentially be used to create weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated means of delivering them, with a view to excluding their military application and at the same time encouraging the use of such technology for peaceful purposes. For its part, Russia intends to introduce such a national system of export controls as early as possible.

17. One of the most important aspects of the problem of preventing the proliferation of new types of weapons and the technologies for their manufacture is to establish a system to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology by creating an effective global monitoring structure in this field.

18. In our view, the problems of non-proliferation, including the limitation of the spread of weapons technology and know-how have a human dimension as well.

19. We are aware of the concern of the world community about a possible "drain", during the radical cut-back in military programmes in Russia, of some of our experts who have been working on the development of dangerous types of armaments, and we are instituting measures to prevent such a dangerous turn of events. The best solution would obviously be to engage such experts in international conversion projects in which other States are also interested. We expect that substantial assistance will be given in this area by the International Science and Technology Centre which is being set up in Russia, for it will coordinate research in such areas as pure and applied physics, alternative sources of energy, including thermonuclear synthesis, safety of nuclear power stations, rehabilitation of the environment polluted by nuclear activities, safe disposal of industrial wastes, etc. We hope that the near future will also see the implementation of other projects of international support for Russia's scientific community, which is determinedly breaking free from the wardship of the military industrial complex.

20. Russia made a constructive contribution to the development by the five permanent members of the Security Council of guidelines on non-proliferation and the arms trade, the implementation of which will also help to limit the spread through the world of dangerous technologies which can be used to create weapons.

21. Russia occupies one of the leading places in the world in terms of level of scientific and technological development, it attaches special importance to the development of international links in this area, especially with regard to the further strengthening of international security and the establishment of mutually advantageous cooperation at the global level, and it intends to make a vigorous contribution to the efforts of the world community to establish a single scientific and technological space as part of the new world order.

THAILAND

[Original: English]

[22 September 1992]

Royal Thai Army

1. Currently, there is no standard for categorizing high-technology materials. The American standard is the only measurement used to discriminate nuclear warheads and intermediate range missiles (200-400 miles), including fire-control radar with highly penetrating radio waves. At present, there are no arms of that category in the Royal Thai Army's organizational equipment except the AN/TPQ-36 radar, whose effective range goes beyond the border. But it is likely to be used as defensive equipment given the Royal Thai Armed Forces' defensive strategy.

2. Most of the Army's equipment is obtained from the United States through Foreign Military Sales, that is, on a government-to-government basis.

Royal Thai Navy

3. Resolution 46/38 D, entitled "The transfer of high technology with military applications", refers only to the transfer of military high technology, but not to its sale. However, any deals in high technology equipment do comply with resolution 46/36 L, entitled "Transparency in armaments", which established the Register of Conventional Arms.

4. The Royal Thai Navy considers high technology in this sense a production technology as regards ballistic missiles with nuclear, biological and chemical warheads, radar absorption paints and production machinery for high-precision components of equipment. At present, the Navy obtains none of those items.

5. Concerning safeguards in this matter (particularly as regards transfer to third countries), the Royal Thai Armed Forces have a memorandum of understanding or agreement, together with the Arms Export Control Act, which the Royal Thai Navy must adhere to.

Royal Thai Air Force

6. The Royal Thai Air Force currently has no specific directives on transfer of military high technology. Directives will be produced on a case-by-case basis or in the form of an annex to the relevant agreement.